Can artificial intelligences be moral agents?

Publication date: Available online 8 January 2019Source: New Ideas in PsychologyAuthor(s): Bartosz Brożek, Bartosz JanikAbstractThe paper addresses the question whether artificial intelligences can be moral agents. We begin by observing that philosophical accounts of moral agency, in particular Kantianism and utilitarianism, are very abstract theoretical constructions: no human being can ever be a Kantian or a utilitarian moral agent. Ironically, it is easier for a machine to approximate this idealised type of agency than it is for homo sapiens. We then proceed to outline the structure of human moral practices. Against this background, we identify two conditions of moral agency: internal and external. We argue further that the existing AI architectures are unable to meet the two conditions. In consequence, machines - at least at the current stage of their development - cannot be considered moral agents.

Source: New Ideas in Psychology - January 8, 2019 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Source Type: research